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An increasing level of technology that has and still is facing criminal law and the administration of criminal justice with ever new questions is part and parcel of our information society. In the Netherlands, this has led to the introduction of new penal provisions in substantive criminal law in the 1992 Computer Crime Act, to new investigative methods in procedural criminal law in the Computer Crime Act and later in the revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the occasion of the introduction of special investigative powers, to new forms of supervision and sanctioning in the penitentiary field and lastly also to new methods of monitoring at public places by the authorities to prevent punishable acts. A legislative proposal has since been submitted to amend the Computer Crime Act II with much needed updating in substantive criminal law, formal criminal law and procedural criminal law, which the legislature deems necessary in connection with the turbulent developments in information technology since 1993. 

Recent legal developments in the European context have served as a motivating factor. In an effort to harmonize the legislation of the various countries of Europe in connection with the transnational nature of this type of crime, in 1989 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe formulated a recommendation with a minimum list of acts to be deemed punishable in the field of computer crime. Supplementing this minimum list, other acts are also conceivable that could be deemed punishable. The Council of Europe sees computer or computer-related crime as “any illegal, unethical or unauthorized behaviour relating to the automatic processing and the transmission of data”.​[1]​ It pertains to the following classification of acts:
- computer related fraud (benefiting financially from the manipulation of computer data, e.g. in an accounting system)
- computer forgery (e.g. committing forgery by altering a computer file with payment orders to be processed by a bank) 
- damage to computer data or computer programmes
- computer sabotage (disturbing a computer system to prevent it from functioning properly)
- unauthorized access to the computer (hacking)
- unauthorized interception of computer data (data espionage)
- unauthorized reproduction of a protected programme (making computer programmes - software - that is protected by copyrights available to the public) 
- unauthorized reproduction of a topography (chips).

In 1995 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe formulated a set of  recommendations in the field of criminal procedural law.​[2]​ They pertained to various powers and obligations including the following:
- search and seizure (searching in computer systems and recording data from them as well as tapping streaming data)
- technical surveillance (tapping telecommunication - telephone conversations - also using new forms of telecommunication such as data communication)
- obligations to cooperate with the investigation authorities (e.g. to produce data from a computerized work requisitioned by the Department of Justice)
- electronic evidence (the integrity and authenticity of accumulated and stored evidence is to be guaranteed as much as possible via certain procedures). 
These are only some of the recommendations that were made. 

In practice however the implementation of these recommendations was not sufficiently effective, so that a decision was made to draw up a binding agreement, the Convention on Cyber Crime.​[3]​ Elaborating upon earlier recommendations made by the Council of Europe, in this agreement the Convention states are given a large number of criminal law and procedural criminal law issues to regulate. This agreement also contains the conditions and guarantees with respect to the application of criminal procedural powers which in essence should be applied in keeping with the requirements stipulated in the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in keeping with the principle of proportionality and with respect for the rights of third parties.  

For a proper understanding of Dutch criminal law, attention should be devoted here to the legal classification of punishable acts and the arsenal of sanctions. Dutch criminal law only recognizes two types of punishable acts, i.e. criminal offences and contraventions. The criminal offences are malum in se, in other words serious infringements of fundamental common and human values, and the contraventions are lesser statutory offences (violations of the written rules to maintain order as such in society). Criminal offences are punishable by prison sentences of up to a maximum of twenty years or life sentences, and contraventions are punishable by prison sentences of up to a maximum of one year, with an intention that is less severe. For every punishable act there is also the risk of a fine up to a certain maximum amount, which can be enforced in addition to a prison sentence or as sole punishment. There is also the possibility of a Community Service Order, formerly referred to as an alternative punishment. This Community Service Order can also be enforced as sole punishment. In addition, the Dutch sanction system has other supplementary forms of punishment such as the Confiscation Order, and measures such as the forced treatment of psychologically disturbed dangerous offenders and the Damage Compensation Order. 

Lastly, it is relevant to note in this connection that in the Netherlands, as in numerous other European and non-European countries, thinking in terms of safety has come to be dominant in virtually all the political debates in Parliament as well as at the various levels of the local administration, in criminal justice policy as it is shaped by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Department of Justice, and in the board room of innumerable private corporations in so far as they feel responsible for the safety of the individuals in their province.
	Dutch society has been indisputably confronted with a growing amount of violent crime, at any rate relatively speaking, and sexual crime such as rape (sometimes committed against extremely young people, e.g. by dangerous pedoxsexuals who have proved incurable), and nowadays a number of murders committed by extremely young male and even female minors. On various occasions, a special role is played by the issue of people with a non-Dutch cultural background who have trouble integrating into Dutch society. There are for example boys of eighteen who are pressured by their father to eliminate the man who has abducted his daughter without marrying her, an existing cultural pattern in Turkey, i.e.  avenging the family honour. 
Liquidations in broad daylight in circles of drug barons and other millionnaire magnates who apparently have ties with the underworld are no longer quite an exception. These are only a few examples. But the general picture people now have in mind of the world of crime does not make them feel safe. Not that the dangers should be overestimated. As regards our topic, it is of particular importance that in the framework of the administration of criminal justice, in recent years the issue of safety has increasingly come to be a top priority, and it is sometimes all too easy to completely or partially ignore the people’s rights and values guaranteed by criminal law and procedural criminal law in an effort to achieve this end. 
We should bear in mind that there are numerous variations and gradations of severity and reality to the concept of safety. We should also seriously consider the fact that in order to be adequately respectable and to sufficiently meet with the principles and norms of the Rule of Law, Dutch criminal law is subject to a system of checks and balances, according to which the element of efficiency should not be put first and foremost without being duly disputed and regulated. Efforts should be consistently made to achieve a certain proportionality between the degree of violation or real threat to the people’s safety and the necessary infringement upon the legal position of the individual (the suspect). 
 Members of Parliament, the Minister of Justice, representatives of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, high Police Department officials and even sometimes university law professors have regularly voiced opinions in the press and other media however to the effect that granting all too many rights to suspects hampers the functioning of justice in an impermissible fashion.

A separate position is taken by a series of steps and moves which one has made recently, also  to the purpose of the criminal procedure, with a view to the war against terrorism (see sub 6). 

2. Substantive criminal law

In the 1980s or even earlier, the first cases emerged of the wrongful seizure (without permission) of computer data from someone else’s computer. The question arose of whether this could be classified under the traditional penal provisions for theft or embezzlement. Could computer data indeed by legally viewed as goods that could be stolen or embezzled? This question was answered affirmatively by the judge up until the moment the Supreme Court decided differently in 1996: the appropriation of computer data did not withdraw it from the power of the original owner. As a result of the multiple nature of computer data, it can be made available to various people at various places at the same time. This made it clear that the traditional descriptions of theft (‘take away’ some good from another person) or embezzlement (‘appropriation’ of another person’s good) were not adequately applicable to electronic material.
As far back as 1992 though a number of new offences in the field of computer crime  were added to the Criminal Code.​[4]​ Under the heading in the Criminal Code where unlawfully entering a dwelling is cited as a punishable act, the section on “unlawfully entering a computer” makes it punishable to “break into” another individual’s computer (Section 138a of the Criminal Code). Hacking is viewed as unlawfully entering a computerized work for the storage or processing of data by penetrating the existing safety system or using false signals and is punishable by a maximum prison sentence of six months. Copying data from the computer or recording data for another party is punishable by a maximum of four years. 
A bill has been proposed to introduce a new section to the Criminal Code, Section 138b, making it punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one year to use a public telecommunication network or public telecommunication service to send another party data  designed to hamper his access to that network or that department (bombing). This last mentioned is often the work of teenagers. Schoolboys do this just for kicks and in this way they are a true plague to the community. So it turned out recently that the creator of a very destructive computervirus was an 17 years old schoolboy.​[5]​
In Section 139a of the Criminal Code and the six consecutive sections, a number of acts are made punishable that involve violations of the private lives of fellow citizens. These acts include using technical equipment to listen to or record a conversation being held in a home or closed premises without having received instructions to do so from one of the individuals taking part in the conversation and without being one of the participants in the conversation (Section 139a of the Criminal Code), which is punishable by a maximum prison sentence of six months. Section 139b of the Criminal Code pertains to using technical equipment to covertly listen to or record a conversation that is not being held in closed premises, which is punhishable by a maximum prison sentence of three months. Section 139c of the Criminal Code makes it punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one year to use technical equipment to deliberately tap or record data conveyed by public telecommunication networks that are not meant in whole or in part for the party himself. It is also punishable by a maximum prison sentence of six months to place technical equipment at a certain spot for the purpose of being able to unlawfully listen to, tap or record a conversation, telecommunication, or other data transfer. 
This last example makes the previous stage,  prior to covertly listening to, tapping or recording a conversation also punishable by law, which is a controversial issue in Dutch criminal law, i.e. preparing to carry out an act. Possibly preparing for a criminal offence is not the same as taking the first step in actually performing the act itself, which is what is required for it to be a punishable attempt to commit that offence (see Section 45 of the Criminal Code and the jurisdiction about it).​[6]​ In my opinion this kind of independent penalization of a preparatory act implies a need for it to be clearly demonstrated in court that the act in question could not have been performed for any other reason than to prepare for the presumed criminal offence.
In 1994 the criminal legislature introduced a separate penalization (Section 46 of the Criminal Code) for preparatory acts in general, be it solely pertaining to extremely severe criminal offences punishable by a prison sentence of eight years or more. This legislation was focused in particular on combating organized crime, such as the large-scale drug trade, but the organized aspect of the crime has since been nullified as a requirement for the applicability of this section of the Criminal Code. Section 46 of the Criminal Code emphatically requires evidence of deliberately acquiring, producing or having at one’s disposal objects, material or information bearers “apparently meant” for committing the criminal offence in question. Section 139e of the Criminal Code also makes it punishable by law by a prison sentence of a maximum of six months to have and use data unlawfully listened to, tapped or recorded using the methods referred to above. 
It is also punishable by law to deliberately and unlawfully produce camera recordings of someone who is present in a home or at some other place that is not accessible to the public using technical equipment that is not clearly visible (Section 139f of the Criminal Code, punishable by a prison sentence of a maximum of six months).

This is closely linked to the contravention cited in Section 441b of the Criminal Code.​[7]​ This article covers the penalization of the covert unlawful production of a picture of an individual at a spot accessible to the public using a hidden camera installed for this specific purpose. Up until 1 January, the forbidden area was confined to a shop, hotel, restaurant or pub, but it has since come to include every spot that is accessible to the public. It is all the more urgent to legally regulate the use of camera monitoring at public places by the local authorities (see part 4 below). 
As a result of the penalization, the cameras in question are only allowed if they are clearly visible to the public. The production of pictures not only refers to taking pictures but also to reproducing live images via a monitor. The use of a hidden camera by a reporter is not prohibited by definition. Under certain conditions, the right to freely report the news can justify an infringement upon the personal privacy of an individual who is being filmed with a hidden camera. 
Nor is the unannounced installment and use of webcams classified by definition as an act punishable by law. As a rule, webcams are not intended to focus on a specific individual. But if this is the express intention, it can be viewed as a punishable act. 
Advertising and focusing attention on technical equipment that is suitable for covertly listening to, tapping or recording conversations, telecommunication or the computerized transference of data and that can be purchased from the party himself are similarly punishable as contravention (Article 441a of the Criminal Code). 

Up to now, the reason why various criminal offences are penalized centred around the protection of privacy. But the protection of property and assets can play a role as well. Using technical equipment to gain access to telecommunication services accessible to the public such as telephone lines or paid tv without completely paying for them has been made punishable as a form of fraud and thus as a property offence. Section 326c of the Criminal Code makes it punishable by a maximum prison sentence of three years. Openly presenting for distribution or having in one’s possession an object or data indicative of the apparent plan to commit this kind of fraud are made punishable in Paragraph 2 of this section by a maximum prison sentence of one year. This too clearly pertains to a punishable preparatory act. 
Deliberately and unlawfully altering, making unfit for use, or deleting data stored in someone else’s computer are made punishable by a maximum prison sentence of two years in the first paragraph of the heading of Section 350a of the Criminal Code on malicious damage and destruction of property. If the perpetrator has unlawfully gained access to the computer by using a public telecommunication network and has caused serious damage to the data in the process, the prison sentence in increased in Paragraph 2 to a maximum of four years. Section 350b of the Criminal Code contains a version of the criminal offence cited in 350a of the Criminal Code as criminal negligence, i.e. the perpetrator has not acted deliberately but has acted negligently and recklessly (maximum prison sentence of one month). 
Violation of the internal secrecies of a firm may be caused by means of the computer:  also the person who makes use of secret data of the firm which are acquired via a criminal offence from a business-computer of the firm and which were not generally well-known the very moment, while some disadvantage because of this will be generated is punishable (Section 173 of the Criminal Code).    

As of 1 June 2004, the unrequested sending of advertising material by email, i.e. spam, is prohibited. The protection of the privacy is involved, as far as one wishes to be free from uninvited seductions. A good example is the so-called Nigarian fraud conceiving an extensive practice of swindle grounded on payments  in advance.  
Internet traffic in the Netherlands has since been frequently hampered by spyware, programmes that covertly lodge in a computer when a user goes to a Web site or downloads software. Spyware barrages the user with advertising windows and alters his computer programmes. 

The immoral offence of child pornography is a special offence beside the general offence of pornography consisting in distributing and publicly showing pornographic pictures and films, especially offered to juveniles up to 16 years old.
It is punishable to distribute, to exhibit publicly, to make and to keep in one’s possession as well the images or databases conceiving images of sexual behavior in which a minor is involved or seemingly is involved  (Section 240 b Criminal Code).The maximum prison sentence for child pornography amounts four years and is much higher than the maximum sentence for general pornography ( maximum of two months and maximum of one year for offering pornography to minors up to sixteen years old). The background of the high maximum for child pornogarphy is the fact of sexual abuse that lies at the bottom of this penalization. 
Even if somebody only possesses a child pornographic picture that proofs to be virtually composed from different other foto’s or images which are not of any pornographic art in itself, the Section of child pornography is applicable. Every stimulation or provocation that could be generated with another person has to be prevented. It is clear that the citizen’s privacy is coming under pressure in this way. One has to be carefull and reserved in making pictures, certainly digital foto’s, of his own children in intimate circonstances, because of the danger that somebody else would make abuse of this.
The distributing of pornography is in many cases done via spam in which images are presented or one has to search for it in a goal-oriented way via the internet. Dutch justice is looking in the first place for the persons who distribute the child pornography, but last year there were about a hundred of criminal cases because of the possession of illegal images and only one because of the achieving of such images. The bulk of these images are made in the East of Europe and in Asian countries.   
     
A completely different kind of electronic offences than the ones that go via the computer are the following. Certain technical law enforcement instruments used by the police can be circumvented by using technical equipment private individuals can purchase for this purpose. This equipment includes radar detectors that caution motorists about the radar signals of speed checks as they approach them, and laser shields that can surround the car with a haze of infrared radiation so that the police are unable to determine how fast the motorist is driving. 

As to future law, the proposed Computer Crime Act II​[8]​ contains stipulations on the protection of email stored by Internet providers and the penalization of email bombs. For the rest, it pertains to procedural criminal law powers. 

3. Procedural criminal law, especially the investigation of punishable acts

It is only logical that procedural criminal law should also gradually include powers related to objects of an electronic nature that operate using technical equipment. The first step was taken in the 1992 Computer Crime Act I. In the 1990s Dutch procedural criminal law was very much in a state of flux for other reasons as well. In Justice Department circles and in the political arena, there was a great deal of commotion and heated debates on the use of certain unorthodox investigation methods by the police in their efforts to cope with drug smuggling. In practice, any number of questionable investigation methods appeared to be in use such as infiltrating criminal organizations and listening and watching techniques that were not covered at the time in the Code of Criminal Procedure and went against the principle of legality. (Section 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure notes that “Criminal procedure is solely conducted in the manner that is stipulated by law.”) What is more, these methods were used to investigate people who were not yet suspects in the legal sense, but could perhaps become suspects.
	Since such great importance is attached to the integrity of the constitutional state and the Rule of Law, a parliamentary inquiry was conducted on this matter in 1995, leading to a substantial change in the law​[9]​ in 1999, whereby various new special investigation methods were legalized as regards suspects of a crime as well as in the event of a reasonable assumption that crimes that can warrant pretrial detention, in other words more serious crimes, are being planned or committed in an organized framework (consequently without there being any suspicion of a concrete crime). In which case they have to be crimes that represent “a serious infringement upon the legal system”, whatever that may mean. This greatly expands the action radius of the investigative powers that were traditionally confined to the person suspected of having committed a crime, i.e. the individual about whom “evidence or circumstances suggest that he is guilty of a punishable act” (Section 27 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure, CCP).
            The special investigative powers that were added include systematic observation (systematically following the suspect), infiltration (anonymously taking part in a criminal group), pseudo-purchases by an undercover agent, systematically gathering information about the suspect, entering closed premises or using technical equipment to safeguard clues there or to determine the presence of certain goods or substances and so forth. What is more, an investigation in this expanded version can be preceded by an exploratory investigation that can already be conducted if there are indications that certain serious crimes are being planned or committed within groups of individuals without their having already reached the stage of a reasonable suspicion. This is not an investigation, it is the preparation for an investigation. This exploratory investigation is conducted under the authority of the Public Prosecutor. 
	
The use of technical instruments has not only become an important aspect of the prosecution in this connection but in other ways as well. To start with, in the future charges will be able to be registered with the police via the computer (informing the police electronically), so that it is no longer necessary to come to the police station. In addition, the police will be able to electronically formulate and send an official report.​[10]​ The whole issue is subject to a number of conditions with respect to checking the identity of the person filing the charges and the person drawing up the official report and the reliability of the contents of the charges filed and the official report.  It has to be easy to trace the person filing the charges not only in connection with the further proceedings regarding the charges but also in order to prevent as much as possible false charges from being filed. 

Electronic equipment has become part and parcel of the total field of investigation. Furthermore preparations are made to investigate a bank for forensic tracks to facilitate the investigative activities.​[11]​ The new bank will be composed of data from the DNA-bank, the fingerprintsbank etcetera. It should to be noted here that on the basis of a new Act all persons who are convicted on the ground of a violent or sexual offence if that is punishable by a maximum of four years or longer may be obliged tot subject themselves to a DNA test.​[12]​ The result will be stored in the DNA databank. This may be in the interest of any investigation in the future and moreover this may have some preventive effects.

During the preliminary inquiry, the investigating judge can order an individual who can be reasonably assumed to have access to certain data stored in a computer, which can serve to reveal the truth, to grant access to these data (Section 125i of the CCP). In searching the computer, an investigation can also be conducted in a computer situated elsewhere in search of data of this same kind if the individuals who live or work at the site of the search have been granted access with the permission of the party in question (Section 125j of the CCP). There are special prohibitions if the individual involved is under a professional or official obligation of confidentiality, as is the case for example with lawyers, notary publics or physicians (see Section 125 l of the CCP). As soon as it appears that they are not of significant relevance to the investigation, all the data found and successively recorded in this framework should be destroyed (see Section 125n of the CCP). 
In the event of a suspicion of a serious crime, the investigating judge can order a systematic investigation whereby a specific individual is also followed in closed premises that are not a residence. The investigating judge can order technical equipment to be used, but without confidential communications being recorded by it (Section 126g of the CCP). The Public Prosecutor can order the investigating official to enter closed premises and use technical equipment to make a recording there, safeguard clues there, or determine the presence of certain goods (Section 126k of the CCP). In a recent bill, the powers of the Public Prosecutor are stipulated in a more precise way than is now the case to lay claim to all the traffic that has taken place via a public communication network if and when the suspect or some individual who seems to be part of a certain organized framework has taken part in it (Sections 126n and 126u of the CCP).​[13]​  

A crucial and not undisputed bill pertains to laying claim to data in general.​[14]​ As a result of the use of information and communication technology, social agencies and commercial companies have more and more information about people. Transactions are conducted electronically with increasing frequency and data are automatically processed and stored. The data can however also play a crucial role in crime detection. Investigators are now largely dependent on people volunteering to produce this information. The agencies and companies involved are limited in this connection by the Protection of Personal Information Act, so that they are not free to make personal information available or to request information themselves. 
The Dutch authorities are of the opinion that possibilities for producing information of this kind should be expanded. In accordance with the relevant bill, an investigating officer will be able to request identifying information on a specific person such as his name, address, date of birth and sex as well as his customer number, policy number or bank account number. At the beginning of criminal proceedings, information of this kind can give the Police and Justice Departments a head start as regards the individual being investigated and the links between various situations and individuals. In addition, the Public Prosecutor will be able to lay claim to information about the duration, date, location and nature of certain services that have been provided and about accounts and other payment traffic. 
The bill also makes it possible to lay claim to extremely sensitive information about a person’s religion, race, political beliefs, health and sex life. This can represent a severe infringement upon this person’s private life, which is why the authorization of the investigating judge is first required. The bill is assumed to be in keeping with the required guarantees stipulated in the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular Section 8  (the protection of privacy). The regulations will be formulated very precisely so as to adequately foresee any possibility of an infringement upon a person’s privacy. Any request for information will have to be submitted in writing and an official report will be drawn up so that it is feasible to adequately monitor the arrangements.  

Furthermore the Dutch Government holds as his opinion that it has to be possible to make more use of information of the General Intelligence and Security Service in the commune criminal process. The protection of the security officers concerned has to be safeguarded by an anonymous hearing before the investigating judge, who has to give account of this in his report in the interest of the sucurity of the state.​[15]​ It is clear that this view is related in the first place to the war against terroristic acts.  

This survey is far from complete. The developments are still very much under way. I should also note that it is not only the powers of the Police and Justice Departments that are involved. There has also been a relatively new movement to involve the public more in crime prevention and detection efforts. On various occasions, chiefs of police have publicly recommended putting information on the Internet about the frequent perpetrators of offences that in themselves might not be that serious, such as shoplifting and stealing bicycles (very common vehicles in the Netherlands) , but that are a great nuisance to the community, and distributing their descriptions and modus operandi in certain neighbourhoods. An announcement has been made in the city of Utrecht for example that in the course of 2004 approximately 800 descriptions of perpetrators are to be put on the Internet.
Comparable proposals were also made in the past as regards sex offenders to caution the parents of young children about people with a record as sex offender living in thir area. This might seem like an appropriate thing to do in the American and British naming and blaming culture, but up to now it is not a practice that has been adopted in the Netherlands. The latest notions about frequent offenders are also dangerous in that citizens might decide to take the law into their own hands, and make a lot of big mistakes in the process. The privacy of the individuals involved is very much an issue here. The police chiefs referred to above do not seem to care. As one of them noted, “People who do not respect the privacy of others have less right to privacy themselves.”​[16]​ Referring to the frequent offenders of more serious crimes, another police chief even stated, “Privacy legislation is turning into a shelter for evil.”​[17]​ 
Meanwhile the first incident already happened: in the shop-window of a tabaccoshop a photo of an old woman (79 years) was exhibited with the following text: ‘This woman has stolen here!’. The woman’s family came into action and reported that she is suffering from the Alzheimer disease with a growing dementia. Subsequently the tabaccoshopkeeper was summoned to appear for the judge with the claim to made a rectification.​[18]​ The judge only stated on the part of the shopkeeper a violation of the woman’s copyright to her own portrait (August 2004). 
Nevertheless the lesson to learn is that though many shopkeepers are taunted by shoplifting in their shops it is only he police who has the statepower to take steps and not the citizens themselves. Taking law into one’s own hands and putting persons in the pillory carries the risk of escalating effects and is forbidden for that reason. If the public takes its own power the experience is that painfull mistakes are hardly to avoid and that the reactions of the public have the inclination to go beyond proportionallity. In many cases this means a more or less durable attack on a person’s integrity and privacy. This all creates serious obligations for the police actively to come into operation in all cases of shoplifting.  

Lastly, the use of computer data in the practice of sentencing has become quite widespread. In principle, guidelines on sentencing in the Netherlands are intended to pertain to sentencing as required by the Public Prosecutor (in his requisitory) and have been formulated by the highest officials at the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Acting totally autonomously and independently and taking the special circumstances of the specific case into consideration, the independent judge then pronounces the actual sentence. The guidelines can nonetheless still exert a great deal of influence on the sentencing. In addition, as regards any number of criminal offences the judge can consult internal information on data compiled on the basis of the sentences pronounced in comparable cases elsewhere in the past. 
              The out-of-court settlement practice of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which has the right to offer the suspect an out-of-court settlement instead of sentencing in all cases of crimes punishable by a maximum prison sentence of six years, is however an instance where the influence of guidelines is extremely significant. The suspect has to agree with the settlement conditions that he will have to meet with, for example by paying a fine or doing a limited number of hours of community service. In the future, the Public Prosecutor will be able to pronounce a limited sentence completely independently, but never a prison sentence, which can constitutionally only be pronounced by an independent judge. The sentence of the Public Prosecutor will be inducted and stored in the record of convictions. 
The use of the computer in calculating the appropriate sentence only endangers the individualized tradition of the administration of criminal justice in the Netherlands. 

4. Administrative prevention and supervision

Camera monitoring on public streets

Cameras were first used for monitoring purposes in public spaces about five years ago in the Netherlands. This initially involved local experiments with cameras being installed on the streets of certain entertainment districts and prostitution centres with the intention of promoting social control there and preventing or at any rate reducing the amount of crime and nuisance to the neighbourhood, such as the noise at night, public drunkenness, overt use of drugs or harassment of passers-by. The need for a legal regulation of this form of monitoring was soon acknowledged by the government (the Ministers of Home Affairs and Justice had already written a letter to Parliament about it in 1999). 
	The generally positive experiences in various municipalities have since been formulated in a research report. In general. There are fewer disturbances of the peace if a camera has been installed. It is not quite clear to what extent this reduction can be simply attributed to the presence of camera monitoring, but there has been an increase in the sense of safety on the part of the people and the police alike. The police also appear to be able to intervene more adequately. There is a great deal of social support for the use of these cameras. The report concludes that the fear of people’s privacy being infringed upon has proved to be unfounded. 
	A bill was submitted to Parliament in February 2004.​[19]​ There are various reasons for a legal regulation of the situation. Modern camera technology can generate extremely sensitive personal data, such as digitalized identification codes for individuals based on physical features. This is of very sweeping significance. There is also the matter of the ongoing further improvement and intensification of the technology, which is why legally regulating the situation can improve the uniformity of camera monitoring and the legal security of the people. Approximately fifty municipalities have submitted camera monitoring regulations to the Board for the Protection of Personal Data, a central national agency that supervises the protection of privacy in any number of fields in the framework of the Protection of Personal Data Act. The bill stipulates that the Mayor himself is to be the one to order the installation of cameras, and that it requires a City Council ordinance. The Mayor determines the location and  duration of the placement. In connection with the possible use of the recordings in criminal proceedings, for example because of anticipated riots where vandalism, violence and so forth could occur, after prior consultations with the Public Prosecutor the Mayor stipulates the period when the recordings can be directly viewed. It is clear that the bill is in keeping with the above-mentioned (sub 2) expansion on 1 January 2004 of the punishability of the covert use of a camera at places that are accessible to the public. 
	The Dutch Supreme Court has recently made a decision on an important question.​[20]​ It pertained to someone in Rotterdam who conspired with two other individuals to unlawfully paint graphiti on two lampposts and an automated teller machine that did not belong to them and thus caused damage in the sense of Section 350 of the Criminal Code. The evidence of the acts consisted however of recordings made in the framework of the camera monitoring on the street in Rotterdam, which registered the conduct of the parties in question for a short period of time in the public space. The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court concluded that the privacy of the suspect had not been infringed upon, since the observations made using the camera “did not have to do with any situation where the suspect could expect to have total privacy to do as he saw fit.” What is more, it would be erroneous, according to the Supreme Court, to assume that an inadequate legal basis for the camera monitoring in itself would mean the observations would produce an infringement upon the privacy of the suspect. 

5. Penitentiary law
    
New forms of execution of prison sentences and electronic monitoring

In the field of penitentiary law, the use of electronic equipment is no longer out of the ordinary. To start with, the degree of security is one of the most important criteria for the distinctions between the various penitentiary and treatment institutions in the prison system. The various types of institutions for various categories of prisoners are characterized by sizeable differences in the extent of security. This is of great significance for how the various institutions operate. Nowadays the security system largely consists of electronic equipment for opening and closing external and internal doors, electronic cameras on the outer walls of the institutions and in the common halls and corridors, equipment for opening and closing the doors of the cells and having a conversation with the prisoners via an intercom if the prisoners ask for it and so forth.

An inherent element of the imprisonment situation is that in many ways, there is a severe reduction in the privacy and many of the other constitutional rights of prisoners. In certain cases, one of the most severe infringements upon the privacy of a prisoner is permanent camera observation in the cell. It is true that this is an exception, but if this method is used it is perceived by the prisoner as extremely unpleasant. The possibility of observing prisoners with a camera has long been accepted as regards prisoners who are in a special punishment cell or isolation cell as a measure to preserve the order and safety in the prison, or who have led the staff to reasonably believe they might attempt to commit suicide. 
In 2002, there was nonetheless this kind of camera monitoring in the case of an individual in provisional custody suspected of killing a Dutch politician, without his having been placed in a punishment cell or isolation cell. Moreover there was no reason to fear he would attempt to commit suicide. The real reason for the camera monitoring in his cell was the widespread public indignation about the murder and the desire of the authorities to make sure nothing would go wrong with the proceedings and that he would not in any way be able to evade the administration of justice. Since the existing ministerial regulations did not provide any basis for this camera monitoring, he submitted a complaint. The Minister of Justice quickly supplemented the existing regulations with respect to the daily routine in the cell. Camera monitoring was not only now possible in order to preserve the order and safety in the institution and in the interest of the mental and physical condition of the prisoner, it was also possible if the prisoner’s escape or any damage to his health would generate a great deal of unrest in society. The camera monitoring was thus covered after all.​[21]​ Camera monitoring should however only be assumed to be used in extremely unusual cases for this reason. A legal provision is now being drawn up.​[22]​ The striking thing about these new sections of the law is that penitentiary authorities are not only attributed with the task of serving penitentiary interests. Under certain circumstances, they are also given the task of allowing procedural criminal law interests to prevail in their decisions about individual imprisonment situations. 

Another electronic aspect of the penitentiary equipment is the electronic monitoring consisting of an anklet fastened around the person’s ankle and electronically linked to a computer connected to a local monitoring centre. This electronic monitoring is a condition that enables prisoners sentenced to lengthy imprisonment to spend time outside the walls of the prison to help them in the transition to freedom at the end of their prison sentence. They can take part in a special so-called penitentiary programme that can consist of attending a vocational training course or undergoing treatment or both. The individual remains in his own home or at the home of reliable relatives, but has to adhere strictly to all the exact times of the programme. This is electronically registered so that if he violates any of the rules, he can be immediately transferred back to the prison. It is clear how tempting it is to exceed and overstep the limited freedom that is allowed. 

The idea has also been suggested of perhaps using this kind of electronic monitoring in the last stage of treatment measures during Her Majesty’s pleasure imposed by the judge, if the individual has gradually been allowed, step by step, a certain amount of freedom with less safeguarding and accompaniment outside the mental institution in the course of his lengthy treatment. This would make for a gradual transition to freedom. This treatment measure is enforced in the case of individuals who have committed a serious crime but are not deemed completely accountable for it by the judge on the grounds of their mental disorder. No matter how careful and cautious the authorities are, serious crimes are sometimes committed during these leaves. This was recently the case when an individual detained under a hospital order left the clinic and seized the opportunity to kidnap and sexually abuse a young girl. She was fortunately returned to her home safe and sound, but Parliament demanded that the Minister of Justice take drastic measures. The Minister of Justice is now considering the possibility of introducing the electronic anklet in certain cases if the risk assessment calls for it. 

In the first place for ex-prisoners the way is important in which their data laid down in the record of the Department of Justice are dealt with. This is of interest for their resocialisation and social reintegration, for example in relation to acquiring a job and housing. The record of convictions is cybernated and located in a central documentation of the Department of Justice (in Almelo). The new Act (that came into force 1 april 2004)​[23]​ attributes to the minister of Justice the power to decide on delivering a certificate of a good behaviour. The minister achieves the security check and makes an assessment of the integrity of the person concerned. Before the Major was the authority who had to make this decision on the basis of the data that were available to him. Probably the Major being a local authority is closer to the daily social needs and sensitivities of the local population and their housing- and worksituations. 
Only after twenty years all data will be removed from the documentation, which term can be extended with the duration of the imposed prison sentence. Very serious sexual offences will be removed if the convict person dies. Contraventions will be removed after five years.        

6. Measures in the war against terrorism   

‘The more war against terrorism, the less privacy’ was the heading of an article in a newspaper on the most recent developments around this subject. It is not very surprising that a set of meaures has been esteemed necessary and that in some respects privacy loses weight more than is usual. But tis all is not without limits. After the assaults of 11 september 2001 (New York) and of 11 march 2004 (Madrid) the Netherlands can’t remain behind. Moreover all European countries cooperate more and more in this field of action. The Dutch minister of Justice is considering an attack on one ccountry as an attack on all countries.​[24]​  
Meanwhile the government conceived the plan to add to the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service a special secret service to which drastic powers will be attributed in the event of a seriously threatening terror, for example to bring telephone traffic and electricity to a standstill, but also to intercept telephonecalles and mails and to search in the databases of individuals. This is in accordance with the European developments. So the European Union wishes to save certain data of all citizens with regard to the persons with whom they did have telephonecalls and to the websites they visited. ‘Bits of Freedom’, an independent organization defending digital civil rights, is worrying about this and predicts critically that the action undertaken today by  intelligence services against suspect persons, will tomorrow be undertaken to all citizens together.​[25]​ 
A slippery slope theory like this is the more probable as it is getting more and more easy to deal with individual and particular data. Such developments could be advanced by the possibilty to combine several data bases with each other: for instance, from a combination of the municipal data bank and the data bank of the immigration service one might derive the names of  Egyptian young men of twenty years old who arrived in the Nederlands during the last five years. A next combination with the list of telefonecalls and e-mails to Pakistan produces a number of names of suspect persons.
We saw (sub 3) the tendency to enlarge the possibilities to make use of information of the General Intelligence and Security Service in the commune criminal process. Eevntually the securuty officers concerned may act anonymously. 
Important in relation to the war against terror is the intended introduction of a general obligation for everybody to present one’s identification card on request of the police without reservations. Furthermore a Bill is proposed on terroristic offences, conceiving higher prison sentences for offences that are committed with a terroristic view, for example a murder with the aim ‘to intimidate the Dutch poulation”.​[26]​ 

7.  Summary /  Conclusions    

Increasing technology has resulted in the first place to the penalization of impermissible acts committed by means of and in relation to the computer (Computer Crime Act). In many cases the protection of the privacy of fellow citizens is aimed at, as far as this is bound to computer data and private conversations not to be tapped. Neither it is allowed to take pictures without the concerned persons’s consent by means of a hidden camera in private, nor in public places. Professional aims of the press might be a justification occasionally.
Dealing with child pornogaphy and the possession of child porno is punishable too, even if  pictures are at stake which are made and composed in a virtual way.
Besides new investigation methods on the basis of elecronic and cybernated developments are introduced in criminal procedure law. However these are introduced and extended in a somewhat crumbled way. 
In the field of criminal procedure the Council of Europe did strive after some harmonization via recommendations for the member-states, but it didn’t succeed very well. Now the the concept has been created for the Convention on Cyber Crime. 
A very important and persistant motive is the thinking in terms of safety that became more and more dominant during the last years. So the preparations are made for the institution of a general bank for forensic tracks, of which the DNA bank will be a part. Recently a new Act has been passed, that obligates every person who is convicted by reasons of a serious violent or sexual crime to subject himself to a DNA test. The result will be stored in the DNA databank. This will happen with a view to the investigation of eventual punishable acts in the future. Moreover this will hopefully work in a preventive sense. And also the data of the record of convictions will be saved for a much longer time if it concerns sexual delinquents than when other types of criminals are involved. Particularly sexual delinquents are in general considered as very dangerous, though in fact this is mainly current for a special category of pathological violent paedophiles who are in fact incurable.
Furthermore it will be possible to investigating officers to request identifying information from social agencies and commercial companies. 
In favour of the war against terrorism new measures are taken already or have been only announced. So information of the General Intelligence and Security Service will may be used in the criminal process.  One has uttered fear for slippery slope mechanisms in the sense of combinations of data banks resulting to the threatening of the privacy. 
Also in the penitentiary context and in the framework of the administrative prevention the electronic monitoring and control are increasing intensively. In exceptional cases permanent camera monitoring in a cell is possible. If a prisoner takes part – during the last stage of a long prison sentence – in a penitentiary program that containing activities outside the prison walls, he is bearing an electronic anklet around his ankle linked to a registrating computer.
Lastly camera monitoring is usual in certain public places. A bill gives a regulation of this subject. According to the opinion of the Dutch Supreme Court the observations made by means of a camera monitoring in the street can be used in the framework of the criminal procedure without violating the right of privacy. This is a decision of a principal significance, maybe one can say: revolutionary.     
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